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ABSTRACT
One of the largest recent private-sector investments and the first airport private-sector concession
in the Maghreb is Enfidha Airport, a key factor in the success of the Tunisian Government’s public–
private partnership (PPP) strategy. However, since Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution, political and social
turmoil is sweeping the country and worsening the economic indicators. This article aims to assess
this PPP infrastructure, allowing us to determine if it is profitable in the long term and contributes
therefore to the economic growth. The case study reveals the key role of the economic, social, and
political environment in Tunisia, the dawn of the Arab Spring.
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Introduction
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) have emerged
among a wide contemporary move of reforms which
aim to involve the private sector more deeply in public
service provision (Osborne, 2000). Indeed, faced with
pressure to reduce public-sector debt and, at the same
time, expand and improve public facilities, govern-
ments have invited private-sector entities to enter into
long-term contractual agreements (Grimsey & Lewis,
2002). They also became result oriented, performance
based, and privatized. Basically, concepts of governance
evolved during the last two decades from a traditional,
authoritarian, bureaucratic governance toward a neo-
liberal ideology—and its critique of the supposed
monopolistic and bureaucratic inefficiencies—based
on market approaches, “post-bureaucratic forms,” and
“government by contract” (Kirkpatrick & Lucio, 1996;
Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Those reforms are referred
to as “New Public Management” and their key tenets
emanate from the public choice theory, principal–agent
theory, and transaction cost theory (Arrow, 1985;
Buchanan & Tolluck, 1962; Downs, 1967; Niskanen,
1971; Williamson, 1985).
Within Middle East North Africa (MENA) coun-
tries, the last few decades witnessed a major shift in
the economic policies—from a central planning and an
important public sector, toward an open market policy
associated with a growing effort of privatization
(UNEVOC Centers, 2006). In this context, PPPs are
becoming a classical way to implement infrastructure
and public procurement in many sectors like transport,
defense, schools, hospitals, and jails (Esposito, 2010).
In Tunisia, PPPs have been for many years a part of
a general policy of modernization of the public sector.
One of the largest private-sector investments in the
country, with total costs of $605 million USD, and the
first airport private-sector concession in the Maghreb
region (IFC, 2008), is Enfidha Airport.
Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” is the first popular
uprising to topple an established government in the
Middle East and North Africa since the Iranian revolu-
tion of 1979. It is also the spark that inspired other
revolutions in the region. Since then, the country is
adrift economically, socially, and politically and the
various after revolution’s governments failed in imple-
menting political, institutional, or social reforms that
might attract international investors or increase oppor-
tunities for project finance and infrastructure develop-
ment in general.
This article provides an analysis of Enfidha
Airport PPP since few evaluations have been realized
about its implementation and evaluation. The analy-
sis is a case study approach based on documents
published by the African Development Bank (AfDB)
and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and
information in the public domain. The key question
under scrutiny is the extent in which PPP can face
Tunisian infrastructure challenges and so far partici-
pate to improve the efficiency of the public service
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delivery. The article presents, first, PPP in MENA
countries and then analyzes the specific case of
Enfidha Airport PPP.
Definition of public–private partnerships
A PPP is an agreement between the government and
one or more private entities for the delivery of a service.
Under this type of agreement, the private partner deli-
vers the service in a way that meets both the govern-
ment’s service delivery objectives and the private
partner’s profit objectives.
Theoretical literature highlights at least threefold
advantages related to PPPs: budgetary advantage, man-
agerial impetus, and technological breakthrough
(Marty, 2008). The budgetary advantage consists in
achieving important programs without supporting the
burden of inherent expenses which is of a high impor-
tance in the context of economic crisis. The second
advantage is taking benefit from cost and scheduling
control which is related to the contract conditions. The
third advantage is that PPP allows the public sector
access to private-sector’s skills and innovation and
technological expertise. Thus, this should lead to a
better quantity and quality for the delivered service
(Estache et al., 2009).
The private counterpart can also reach some benefits
from the PPP contract like to secure its activities
through a long-term contract and to develop them to
high added value activities (Marty, 2008).
Besides, PPPs involve contracting between govern-
ment and the private sector under conditions of imper-
fect information. Consequently, two main strands of
economic theory—principal–agent theory and transac-
tion costs analysis—are very relevant to an understand-
ing of the PPPs.
The principal–agent theory (agency theory) forma-
lizes assumptions about the distribution of property
rights and information while writing contracts that
define organizations. In particular, it focuses on the
relationship between principals and agents who exer-
cise authority on behalf of organizations. The theory
argues that principals must solve two basic tasks in
choosing and controlling their agents. First, they have
to select the best agents, whether employees or con-
tractors, and create motivations for them to behave as
desired. Second, they have to monitor the behavior of
their agents to ensure that they are performing as
agreed (Ayee, 2005). A problem arises when the parties’
goals conflict or when it is difficult or expensive for the
principal to check what the agent is actually doing.
Information asymmetry here introduces an adverse
selection and a moral hazard problem (Arrow, 1985).
Transaction costs arise from the cost of seeking out
buyers and sellers and arranging, policing, and enfor-
cing agreements or contracts in a world of imperfect
information. The idea has been popularized by Oliver
Williamson since the 1960s (Williamson, 1975, 1985).
This theory views the parties attempting to engage in
exchange as contracting both the terms of the exchange
and its execution. A contract should also take into
account all the expenses made in order to reach that
contract, whether they are personal or social. The con-
tracting process can be very expensive because it
includes not only the structuring, monitoring, bonding,
and residual loss costs of the principal–agent problem,
but it also includes the negotiation’s costs (Kettl &
Milward, 1996).
Consequently, PPPs may incur high transaction
costs, especially where there is no culture of PPPs or
little knowledge of the process. When there is govern-
ment provision, production costs will determine the
total social costs, and considering the fact that they
are internalized, transaction costs are likely to be low.
However, managerial inefficiency may mean high pro-
duction costs, it is evident that large government infra-
structure projects have often been way over the budget.
PPPs can lower production costs because of competi-
tive pressures that eliminate managerial inefficiency.
Economies of scale may mean that private-sector
firms have lower production costs (Williamson, 1975).
But, private production can raise transaction costs
because government has to negotiate with suppliers
who have their own incentives (Vining & Boardman,
2008). The effectiveness of the alignment depends on a
sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners (which
may include the operators and the financers) (OECD,
2008). Indeed, the distribution of risk and responsibil-
ities between the two partners is the crucial point of
this contractual agreement. Each risk must be allocated
to the party who can manage it at the minimal cost.
The private partner will be remunerated from payments
made by the user of the service or by direct payments
from the public body based on the service provided, its
availability and different contractual quality, and per-
formance indicators (Marty and Voisin, 2006).
Classification of public–private partnerships
The most cited, and obviously the most straightforward
classification of PPPs, situates different partnership
variants on a range that reflects the extent to which
risk is being transferred from the public to the private
partner. The range runs from a contribution contract
with minimal risk transfer to partnerships with max-
imum risk transfer (Estache et al., 2009). In between the
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 553
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [Q
ata
r U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
1:2
0 2
1 J
un
e 2
01
6 
two are several possible combinations of functions the
private sector can undertake: design, build, finance,
operate, maintain, own, transfer, lease, develop, and
buy (Allan, 1999).
The main different types are:
● Design-Build (DB): Under this model, the gov-
ernment contracts with a private partner to design
and build a facility in accordance with the require-
ments set by the government. After completing
the facility, the government assumes responsibility
for operating and maintaining the facility. This
method of procurement is also referred to as
Build-Transfer (BT).
● Design-Build-Maintain (DBM): This model is
similar to DB except that the private sector also
maintains the facility. The public sector retains
responsibility for operations.
● Design-Build-Operate (DBO): Under this model,
the private sector designs and builds a facility.
Once the facility is completed, the title for the
new facility is transferred to the public sector,
while the private sector operates the facility for a
specified period. This procurement model is also
referred to as Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO).
● Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM): This
model combines the responsibilities of DB pro-
curements with the operations and maintenance
of a facility for a specified period by a private-
sector partner. At the end of that period, the
operation of the facility is transferred back to the
public sector. This method of procurement is also
referred to as Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT).
● Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT): The gov-
ernment grants a franchise to a private partner to
finance, design, build, and operate a facility for a
specific period of time. Ownership of the facility is
transferred back to the public sector at the end of
that period.
● Build-Own-Operate (BOO): The government
grants the right to finance, design, build, operate,
and maintain a project to a private entity, which
retains ownership of the project. The private entity
is not required to transfer the facility back to the
government.
● Design-Build-Finance-Operate/Maintain
(DBFO, DBFM, or DBFO/M): Under this model,
the private sector designs, builds, finances, oper-
ates, and/or maintains a new facility under a long-
term lease. At the end of the lease term, the facility
is transferred to the public sector. In some coun-
tries, DBFO/M covers both BOO and BOOT.
Even if governments typically aim at certain objectives
when developing infrastructure projects, the most com-
mon reason for those partnerships is the financial-eco-
nomic motive, the limited financial capacity of
governments for investments, which makes the prospects
of private-sector cofinancing very important (Farazmand,
1999). Then, it is left to them to find the right equilibrium
between the model of delivery that best addresses those
objectives and the one who will be sufficiently attractive
for private partners.
Critical success factors for PPP
Many studies have developed differing lists of critical suc-
cess factors for PPP, and similarities occur among them.
Farazmand (2004) established two set of conditions for
building and sustaining effective partnerships: (1) pri-
mary, start-up conditions and (2) process conditions.
The primary conditions are interdependence and conver-
gence of objectives and accommodation of goals. The
process conditions are: mutual trust and good faith in
the focused areas of partnership; recognition of limita-
tions of each party; clarification—and recording—of
objectives and strategies; phasing aims of partnership
projects at the verifiable and measurable details; creating
conflict regulations and conflict resolution mechanisms;
focusing on issues, problems, and objectives/goals of part-
nerships; identifying and spelling out legal issues and
procedures; protection of third parties’ interests and
rights; adequate support and control facilities that
enhance partnerships; internal and external coordination
through formal and informal processes, networks, and
mechanisms; appropriate and adequate organizational
arrangements, management, and skills for policy devel-
opment, analysis, and implementation/administration in
partnership-based governance.
Li, Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle (2005) identi-
fied five principal success factor groupings that underlie
project procurement: project implementability, govern-
ment guarantee, favorable economic conditions, and
available financial market.
Qiao, Wang, Tiong, and Chan (2001) developed
eight independent critical success factors in BOT pro-
jects in China: appropriate project identification; attrac-
tive financial package; acceptable toll/tariff levels;
reasonable risk allocation; selection of suitable subcon-
tractors; management control; technology transfer; and
stable political and economic situation.
Public–private partnerships in MENA countries
Infrastructure development is proven to be critical for
economic development and poverty reduction in
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developing countries, and improved infrastructure ser-
vices can help address various development challenges.
However, governments face major issues in ensuring
efficient service provision and meet the growing
demand for infrastructure services mainly due to lack
of financial resources. PPPs represent an opportunity
for the MENA countries as far as they often show high
deficit in infrastructure requirements, while a low qual-
ity is often associated with public service performance.
Thus, PPPs can simultaneously accelerate improve-
ments to public infrastructure, service efficiency, and
service quality which are necessary for economic
growth. PPPs can thus represent a solution to govern-
ment’s economic reform agenda and strategy to
increase private-sector involvement in public services
through leveraging private spending against public ser-
vice budgets (ACWUA, 2010).
In developing countries, contracting out was intro-
duced in the mid-1980s when governments begin pri-
vatizing public enterprises. Policies were adopted to
solve the problem of lack of governmental managerial
capacity, and also to stop the continued dependence of
state enterprises on state subsidies (OECD, 2009).
According to Deloitte, in Africa, between 1990 and
2004, around 14% of public-sector infrastructure was
provided through a PPP, the most common sectors
being water, energy, and transport (Deloitte Research,
2006). In the MENA region, the annual investment
commitments in 2004–2008 were three times those in
1996–2000, which represented one of the fastest regio-
nal growth rates in private participation in infrastruc-
ture (World Bank, 2008). This growing interest from
private investors can be explained by the important
demand for infrastructure and good expectations for
cost recovery in the region. Most of the recent growth
in private participation has been in telecommunica-
tions, but it is also increasing in energy, transport,
irrigation, and solid waste management (World Bank,
2008). However, MENA countries still have difficulty in
attracting private partners. In North Africa, private
investments remain at a low level (Chédor, Teulon, &
Veil-Zarda, 2011).
Now, and since the Arab Spring, political turmoil is
sweeping the MENA region and generating political
and economic issues across the region.
Unemployment has risen, economic growth rates have
fallen, and fiscal deficits and government debt levels
have grown.
Thus, the Arab Spring, which was generated by weak
infrastructure services, is becoming the scene of a chao-
tic political and economic situation which is now slow-
ing down—and even stopping—the contribution of the
private sector in financing expansion or improvement
of infrastructure developments. Nevertheless, it is
obvious that offering general access to adequate infra-
structure services remains crucial to impulse economic
development and growth and to provide jobs in the
region.
In Tunisia, the Revolution, which successfully ousted
longtime President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, consisted
of a series of street demonstrations, in January 2011,
following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on
December, 17, 2011 (Timeline: Tunisia’s uprising,
2011). The demonstrations were an expression of citi-
zens’ frustration over economic issues like unemploy-
ment as well as lack of political freedoms (Mohyeldin,
2011; Sadiki, 2010). Since then, political turmoil is
sweeping the country and is leading to worsening eco-
nomic indicators. The country, which has traditionally
had great success in attracting foreign direct investment
and local project investment, became less attractive to
investors who are less confident and are therefore less
willing to launch new projects or to develop ongoing
ventures.
In this context, this study aims to discuss the poten-
tial of the Enfidha Airport PPP project. The question
asked is: how far is PPP useful to face infrastructure
challenges and so far to contribute to improve effi-
ciency of the public service delivery.
PPP’s practice in tunisia
Tunisia, with an estimated population of just over
10.4 million, has a diverse economy, mostly in the
agricultural, mining, tourism, and manufacturing sec-
tors. Real growth, which averaged almost 5% over the
past decade (official rate), declined to 4.6% in 2008 and
to 3%–4% in 2009/2010 because of economic contrac-
tion and slowing of import demand in Europe,
Tunisia’s largest export market. Though, till 2010,
Tunisia was ranked among the most growing econo-
mies in Africa (African Arab Bank of Development’s
reports, 2012–2013). The January 2011 Tunisian revo-
lution has had a negative impact on the short-term
economic situation, mainly due to the decrease of tour-
ism and foreign direct investment. Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is slowing down, and the rate of
youth unemployment—particularly youth with gradu-
ate degrees—reached unprecedented levels since the
revolution. The social unrest and political turmoil that
overwhelmed Tunisia indicate that key social and
development challenges had not been addressed.
Economic emergency plans and institutional and
structural reforms have been announced by the differ-
ent interim governments, but as the political turmoil
continues, the economic situation is still critical and
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private and foreign investors remain suspicious. Local
investments are oriented to real estate and consump-
tion instead of productive projects which require poli-
tical stability by a democratic transition process.
Access to good-quality infrastructure services is cru-
cial to Tunisian economy, and in order to bring new
investments to the country’s infrastructure sectors, the
government asked PPIAF for support in developing “a
comprehensive strategy for increasing the private pro-
vision of infrastructure and updating the legal, regula-
tory, and institutional framework to support
sustainable public–private partnerships in infrastruc-
ture” (World Bank, 2008).
Since then, the government tried to promote PPPs.
He accepted the need to separate regulatory and oper-
ating functions in port and airport sectors and the need
to broaden private-sector participation beyond sub-
contracting and build-operate-transfer contracts in
water and sanitation. In April 2008, the government
adopted a framework law on concessions, in order to
make the country more attractive to private operators
(World Bank, 2008, 2011).
Actually, PPP has been a part of a general policy of
the Tunisian administrative reform and the legislative
and regulatory framework has been developed in order
to facilitate PPP development (Araujo & Sutherland,
2010). According to the World Bank database, in 2007
there were already seven PPP contracts in Tunisia
(World Bank, 2007): four contracts within energy sec-
tor (electricity and natural gas), two in telecommunica-
tions, and one within airport infrastructure. “The
cumulative amount of investment in the telecommuni-
cations sector amounted to 3.17 billion USD between
1990 and 2007. For the airport, gas and electricity
projects, the amounts of private investment were
respectively USD 840, USD 657 and USD 291 million”
(World Bank, 2007).
Other PPP projects are in progress in Tunisia
including a project for a new deep-water port at
Enfidha, in the framework of a BOT. This project is
similar to many operations in progress in the MENA
region: in Morocco (Tangier), in Egypt (Damiette, Ain
Sukna, Alexandria), and in Jordan (Aqaba).
Enfidha airport—lessons learned
In developing countries, governments are being aware
of the benefit of involving the private sector in mana-
ging and financing airports to improve service provi-
sion. Indeed, an efficient and effective aviation
infrastructure is crucial to development insofar as air-
ports represent essential links to economic
development through flows of human capital, com-
merce, and tourism.
In Tunisia, infrastructure projects have always been
achieved by the government and Enfidha Airport,
located at an emerging town distant at some 100 km
south of Tunis (the capital) and 60 km from the
Monastir Airport, is therefore the first example of
PPP infrastructure in the country and of an airport
concession in the Maghreb region. The project is con-
sistent with the 10th governmental Economic and
Social Development Plan for 2007–2011 which aims
to support PPPs (Ministry of Transportation, 2014).
Since important touristic and industrial develop-
ment projects were planned, modernization and expan-
sion of airport infrastructure became essential. The
main Tunisian airports, located at the north of the
country, were either already saturated (Monastir
Airport), or near to reach saturation point (Tunis-
Carthage Airport). They shuttle to the main touristic
Mediterranean areas of Sousse, Hammamet, and
Monastir. A new airport was necessary and the pri-
vate-sector’s participation served as a catalyst in the
project’s design and implementation. Instead of bearing
the entire cost and dealing with the project risks,
Tunisian authorities decided to rely on private capital
and the private-sector’s managerial ability and state-of-
the-art technology. This has paid off handsomely,
resulting in the construction of a modern, spacious,
comfortable, and efficient airport.
The contract is a 40 years concession and consists of
two linked concessions. The first concession is for
build, operate, and transfer (BOT) of the new airport
at Enfidha and the second one is for the operation and
upgrade of the existing Monastir International Airport
(4.2 million passengers in 2006) (IFC, 2008). The pro-
ject has been awarded to TAV Airports Holding, an
Istanbul-based Turkish company specialized in airports
construction, operation, and management. The com-
pany is managing four airports in Turkey (Istanbul
Ataturk, Ankara Esenboga, Antalya Gazipasa, and
Izmir Adnen Menderes), two in Georgia (Tbilissi and
Batumi), two in Macedonia (Skopje and Ohrid), and
one in Saudia Arabia (Medina).
In 2008, TAV Tunisia Ltd, a subsidiary of TAV
Airports, elaborated a financial plan with
International Finance Corporation (IFC), branch of
the World Bank, and with many commercial banks.
The African Development Bank (AfDB) was also con-
tacted and participated with a 70 million Euros loan.
This project is a central element of Tunisia’s growth
strategy since, by expanding and mondernizing the air-
port infrastructure of Tunisia, it is expected to directly
contribute to the success of the country’s economic
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strategy which is built on two pillars (African
Development Fund, 2008):
– Export-oriented industrialization, with a speciali-
zation in low-cost light manufacturing,
– Tourism development, with major efforts under-
way by the Government to enhance tourist arrival
numbers and reposition Tunisia toward the higher
end of the market.
The project complies with Tunisian’s environmental
regulations, particularly Decree N°91–362 of March
1991, modified in July 2005, on Environment and
Social Impact Assessment requirements, and with the
international standards in project finance, the Equator
Principles. The project also follows the IFC/World
Bank Group best practices environmental standards.
IFC’s environmental and social due diligence indicates
that the investment will have impacts which must be
managed in a manner consistent with the following
Performance Standards:
PS1: Social and Environmental Assessment and
Management Systems
PS2: Labor and Working Conditions
PS3: Pollution Prevention and Abatement
PS4: Community Health Safety and Security
PS5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement
PS6: Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable
Natural Resource Management
PS7: Cultural Heritage
The project is sustainable at the economic and financial
levels and does not represent environmental threats.
The project should contribute to impulse the national
GDP and the global country competitiveness. During
the project construction phase, which lasted 2 years,
some 2200 direct full jobs were created. Close to 70% of
project workers were locally recruited, while the rest
were mainly Turkish expatriates. During the operation
phase, some 1400 jobs were created. Employees at the
airport said they were proud to be working at the
Enfidha Airport as it offered them a good job and a
competitive salary and spares them the pain of migrat-
ing to bigger cities or to Europe.
The project began in July 2007 and the first stage
was achieved in October 2009. According to the airport
management, Enfidha Airport reaches international
performance levels. It has the capacity to handle some
4500 pieces of luggage per hour while respecting
European airport security standards.
As few evaluations of PPP in Tunisia are achieved,
this article aims to analyze the Enfidha Airport PPP. A
case study approach is thus adopted as the research
methodology based on documents published by AfDB,
IFC, and information in the public domain.
The present article aims to assess Enfidha Airport
PPP infrastructure achievement and to highlight some
key elements related to its implementation in order to
determine how profitable the project is and how it
contributes to the country’s economic growth. It points
out three key aspects that emerge from this experience.
First, the opportunity, for a developing country like
Tunisia, to take profit from the private financial, tech-
nical, and managerial experience for an infrastructure
development. Second, the importance of regulatory and
legal framework. Third, a stable economic, political,
and social environment as a critical external success
factor.
The opportunity to take profit from the private
financial, technical, and managerial experience
To support their economic activities, the infrastruc-
tures required by developing countries are those
related to transportation, energy, water, and telecom-
munications. However, the need of high capital invest-
ment and of technology can be a stumbling block to
infrastructure development and many developing
countries cannot afford such development. This is
what Farazmand (2004) refers to as primary start-up
condition to build efficient partnerships: the interde-
pendence and convergence of objectives. That means
that no party—neither the State, nor the private part-
ner—is capable alone of developing the project and
the partnership will materialize the law of relative
advantage. Convergence means that the objectives of
the different parties in the partnership are connected
or at least not incompatible.
In this context, the PPP of Enfidha Airport allowed
the Tunisian government to take profit from a consor-
tium of private financers. It also allowed to take profit
from the building experience of TAV Holding and to
experience new technologies. Then it allowed mobiliz-
ing experienced staff for which the private can provide
higher salaries than public sector. Besides, public staff
have been maintained and have taken profit from the
know-how of the experienced private staff. The access
to finances and to the experience in infrastructure
building makes it possible to reach the construction of
an airport within 2 years, which objective the govern-
ment couldn’t have reached by itself. And, according to
the contract, the property will be transferred to the
government (after 40 years of operating) without any
investment.
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The importance of regulatory and legal framework
The role of the legal framework is to create a favorable
environment to attract private financing and to imple-
ment checks and balances that will ensure that PPPs
deliver their expected value to the public (Boyfield
(1992), Stein (1995), Jones, Zamani, and Reehal
(1996) and Finnerty (1996). Thus, setting an adequate
regulatory and legal framework prior to implementing
PPP contracts is clearly crucial and is amid major
conditions for building and sustaining an effective part-
nership (Farazmand, 2004). According to the World
Bank, “regulatory system should define clear rules for
financial performance, provide practical experience to
the staff responsible for their implementation, and pro-
vide assurance to the private sector that the regulatory
system includes protection from expropriation, arbitra-
tion of commercial disputes, and respect for contract
agreements. In turn, the regulatory system will increase
benefits to the government by achieving better and
more informed decision making, improved perfor-
mance, and by raising efficiency and accountability”
(The World Bank, 1994).
In this context, and in order to attract investors, the
Tunisian government developed a legal adequate fra-
mework related to PPPs. This framework is divided
into two major frameworks. The first one concerns
concessions and is regulated by the law N°2008-23
dated 01/04/2008. From 1998 to 2008, concessions are
treated separately in accordance with laws, decrees,
specifications, and ministerial orders. However, compe-
tition and transparency of the procedures have to be
guaranteed and the creation of a legal framework
related to concessions became necessary. The law N°
2008-23 makes provision for the risk distribution
between the co-contractors and fixes the procedures
of the choice of the concessionaire. It stipulates that
this choice can be performed (i) after direct negotiation
or (ii) after a consultation if the invitation to tender
doesn’t lead to interesting results or (iii) if there is an
emergency related to the continuity of the public ser-
vice delivery by a given entity or (iv) if the contract can
only be achieved by a given entity. This law authorizes
foreigners to participate to concessions. The second one
concerns privatization and is regulated by the law N°
89-9 dated 01/02/1989 (concerning participations, com-
panies, and publicly owned establishments).
The Tunisian experience highlights the importance,
for PPPs, of good public regulations compatible with
international investment conditions. Clear legal rules
and their predictable application offer legal security to
investors. This improves competition for contracts and
reduces the risk premium required—two recurrent
problems with PPPs. Indeed, the Tunisian legal frame-
work for PPPs was completed in 2008 by a generally
applicable law on concessions. The law was intended to
clarify the legal framework and to unify practices and
arrangements previously implemented at the specific
level and governed by diverse preexisting laws. The
law on concessions helped increase the attractiveness
of investing in PPPs by providing all stakeholders with
a clear and coherent legal framework. The law on con-
cessions (the term used by the Tunisian law rather than
PPP) emphasizes transparency during the tendering
process. It introduces a procedure involving competi-
tive consultation: allowing a first phase of competitive
bidding based on an invitation to tender, followed by a
second phase of negotiation.
In this context, Jaloul Ayed (former Tunisian finance
minister, 2011) points out crucial issues to carry out
PPPs. First, to develop an exhaustive regulatory frame-
work, precise, securing, establishing basic rules, and
stimulating private sector to participate. Second, to
promote a Tunisian legal know-how to assist private
agents in their negotiations with local government and
to solve the problem of funding due to exchange risks.
Indeed, it is demonstrated that the quality of legislative
and regulatory frameworks—and the development of
capacity within a public authority for selecting projects,
guiding the selection phase, drawing up contracts, and
monitoring their execution—are all vital in the efficient
and successful use of PPPs in MENA countries (Araujo
& Sutherland, 2010).
The Tunisian experience shows the governmental
impetus to build an adequate regulatory and legal PPP
framework. This allowed attracting foreign private
investors to apply to the airport tender and then,
allowed TAV Holding to operate in the context of the
BOT contract. Meanwhile, it shows some shortcomings
like the need to develop a more adapted legal frame-
work in order to be more attractive to private partici-
pation. And prior to this, it points out the need to
increase public actors’ awareness concerning PPPs.
The importance of socioeconomic stable
environment
Tunisia, one of the more stable areas in the region, was
however, the first Arab nation in the MENA region to
protest against its dictatorial regime, in what became
known as the Jasmine Revolution. Since then, Tunisia
lives a phase of difficult transition, marked by eco-
nomic turmoil and terrorist attacks. The political envir-
onment has been marked with political uncertainty
especially since the assassination of opposition leader
Chokri Belaid (Patriotic Democratic Front Leader)
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February 6, 2013, which was followed by a series of
attacks across the country. Major opposition parties
called for the resignation of the government and the
dissolution of the National Constituent Assembly
(ANC), which was scheduled to vote on the constitu-
tion and finalize the composition of the electoral
authority and pass an electoral law. While social and
economic issues remain at the core of Tunisian con-
cerns, there was an increasing demand for government
to limit policy-making to the passage of the new con-
stitution and electoral law which were delayed beyond
the 1-year commitment. Once the 1-year mark passed
in October 2012, opposition parties began a series of
protests to push for the completion of the process and
elections by end December 2013.
As a consequence, Tunisia’s economic growth slo-
wed down since 2011 and unemployment rates among
university graduates increased. Security concerns and
weak economic performance in the European Union
and Libya have dampened growth. GDP growth was
only 2.7% in Quarter (Q) 1, 2013, and 3.2% in Q2 2013.
Inflation had steadily increased, due to high food
prices, since 2012 to peak at 6.5% in March 2013. It
has since stabilized to 6% in recent months responding
to tighter monetary policy by the Central Bank (The
World Bank, 2014). Authorities estimated that during
the recent upheavals between USD 5 and 8 billion
(around 4% GDP) were lost, tourism revenues have
been seriously affected, key investments have been put
on hold, and numerous jobs have been lost (African
Development Bank, 2011).
The critical economic situation and the political
turmoil have led to countless social movements
through all the economic sectors which had conse-
quently internal and external impacts on Enfidha
Airport achievement. Indeed, local newspapers
reported that either TAV blue collars were on strike
or Enfidha neighborhood citizen were blocking work-
ers’ access to the airport.
Though, written human resource policy established
by TAV follows all national laws with regard to mini-
mum employment age and maximum work hours and
allows freedom of association. Besides that, contractors
whom TAV deals with are required to ensure their
hiring and employment practices are consistent with
national law and the requirements of Performance
Standard 2: Labor and Working Conditions. TAV has
a detailed Health and Safety Environment Plan which
sets standards for occupational safety and work proce-
dures for employees and contractors as well as training
for employees and contractors on worker safety and
emergency response has been conducted at Monastir
and Enfidha. No layoff of workers has been done as a
certain number of staff has been transferred from
Monastir to Enfidha on an initial voluntary basis.
Actually, many staff members have expressed a desire
to work at the new airport as to experience the new
modern work environment. A shuttle service has been
set up to facilitate the movement of staff between their
residences and the two airports (30 km between
Monastir and Enfidha). Finally, TAV employees
absorbed from the Office de l’Aviation Civile et des
Aéroports (OACA) as part of the privatization have
retained all their rights as former OACA employees
and have union representation to assist in the negotia-
tion of all human resource-related issues.
Despite this disposal, strikes and social movements
happened and generated many harmful consequences
like delaying the work, the staff being many times
unable to join their offices, and the loss of many flights
and passengers as tour operators canceled their flights
to Enfidha Airport, activity decreased as well as income.
Borders entry number between 2010 and 2013
decreased by 9.2% (Tunisian Ministry of Tourism).
While it seems that TAV had to deal with unstable
economic and political environment, many studies
inclined toward identifying PPP success factors high-
light the importance of the favorable economic and
political conditions (Brown, Orr, & Luo, 2006; Li
et al., 2005; Qiao et al., 2001).
Dilami and Klein (1997) identify the importance of a
stable and favorable macroeconomic environment for
PPP project development both in developed and in
developing countries, where the private sector can
operate with confidence. Two critical success factors
are involved: a stable macroeconomic conditions and
a sound economic policy.
Regarding the role of the government during this
critical transition, Sengupta (2006) argues that even
though the private developer is expected to perform
all development tasks under PPP, the public agencies
may take on the role of the enabler by providing the
enabling environment for the private partner to step in.
Indeed, PPP should not imply less government but a
different government role as the ultimate responsibility
and accountability of the partnership rests on the
shoulders of the government that has to be accountable
to its people (Farazmand, 1999). This also refers to
what Farazmand defines as a process condition for
successful partnerships: accountability and protection
of rights for all citizens that must be observed as
some powerful groups might influence unfairly the
policy agenda and or implementation (Farazmand,
2004). This is what happened for Enfidha PPP as
OACA employees and citizens were causing delays
due to their various strikes. By then, the Tunisian
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government was overwhelmed by the political, eco-
nomical, and social situation prevailing after the
Revolution and could not focus on Enfidha PPP and
take the expected role of the enabler.
Also, according to Klijn and Teisman (2002), actors
involved in PPP are likely to have different objectives
and contrasting backgrounds which make cooperation
as much challenging. Problems are generated by the
fact that partnerships require many actors and that
those actors are dependent on each other. The multi-
plicity of actors and their various and often conflicting
perceptions, interests, and strategies make these games
complex ones (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972).
Following this approach, the actors involved in
Enfidha Airport PPP are various and have contrasting
backgrounds and their expectations changed after the
2011’s Revolution:
(i) TAV, the contracting company: focused on
market share and profits before the Revolution
and concerned by strikes, social movement, and
political turmoil and the completion of the
contract on time and budget after the
Revolution,
(ii) OACA employees: focused on their well-being
before Revolution and concerned by the
improvement of their economic, social, and
labor conditions after the Revolution,
(iii) National government: focused on policy inter-
est before Revolution and concerned by social,
economic, and political turmoil after the
Revolution,
(iv) Citizens: focused on the success of the achieve-
ment on their region before Revolution and
concerned by direct impact on their social and
economic conditions after the Revolution,
(v) Banks: focused return on investment before the
Revolution and concerned by the contractor’s
solvency and social, economic, and political
conditions after the Revolution,
Today, the economic situation is very critical, the social
situation is worrying, and people dissatisfaction is
increasing. Economic growth is slowing down and not
duly divided. Investment is at a very low level, and
shortfall increases and unemployment is increasing.
Under these circumstances, the first Tunisian
Parliamentary elections on October, 26, 2014, with the
victory of the secular party Nidaa Touness, brought
new hope. It can be viewed as a step toward real
political change and democratization process as it
materializes the liberalization of the political landscape
and a dramatic rise in the levels of civil and political
rights. Analysts described this election as a referendum
on the Islamist-led coalition’s stormy 2 years in office
and punishment for a poor economic performance and
unfulfilled expectations of the revolution. Numerous
opportunities are available and the country can
improve its growth once the period of unrest and
revolution begins to decline. Investors in ongoing and
new development projects need to remain positive as
the region settles and becomes an investor’s market
(Orsi, 2011). The future is optimistic for Tunisia and
many authors define the country as “the only—Arab
Spring country- success story.” However, serious chal-
lenges remain before the full potential presented by the
Tunisian Revolution can be realized. Besides the poli-
tical and security-related challenges that need to be
navigated as the country moves toward presidential
elections, the economy and fiscal balances will be
under pressure as a result of the drop in economic
activity that surrounded in the wake of the
Revolution. Moreover, the underlying social discon-
tentment that drove the Tunisian Revolution—notably
youth unemployment, particularly among young grad-
uates, and regional disenfranchisement—remains
(African Development Bank, 2011). The main battle is
political. Tunisia is engaged in its fight for democracy.
This first Arab Spring country can become the first
sustainable success in the region.
Conclusion
Like many developing countries, Tunisian government
faces fiscal pressure, and the possibility to shift invest-
ment responsibility to private sector has played a cru-
cial role in the increased acceptance of private-sector
involvement in infrastructure development. PPP was
then a solution to better infrastructure provision.
However, since overthrowing its dictator in 2011 and
kicking off the Arab Spring pro-democracy wave,
Tunisia has been buffeted by economic turmoil and
social uprisings. Today, after the first parliamentary
election of October 26, 2014, the outlook seems how-
ever positive as the country begins its transition toward
a new democracy.
This analysis identified the economic and social
environment as a key success factor for the construc-
tion and management of a PPP infrastructure in
Tunisia after its Jasmine Revolution. This finding has
a pragmatic value. Indeed, 3 years after the uprisings in
Tunisia, economic and social environments remain
unsteady and hindered the achievement of Enfidha
Airport. This assessment leads us logically to question
the other PPP achievements. Today, Tunisia should
capitalize the hope of change and democracy brought
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by the Arab Spring in order to generate increased
opportunities for PPP infrastructure projects in the
country. Consequently, the key capacity challenge that
the new government face includes the capacity to settle
down the sociopolitical climate to reassure and attract
local and foreign investors.
The MENA region may become a major interna-
tional center of economic development if it successfully
transitions to democracy. Numerous opportunities are
available in this region (Orsi, 2011). The MENA popu-
lation is due to significantly increase and that growth
will require important investments in new infrastruc-
ture. An estimated amount of 500 billion is to be spent
in the region by 2020 on infrastructure development
through PPPs (Roudi-Fahimi & Kent, 2007).
Modifications of the national political and social issues
should be carried in advance in order to facilitate PPPs.
References
African Development Bank. (2011). The revolution in
Tunisia: Economic challenges and prospects. Retrieved
from http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/
Documents/Publications/North%20Africa%20Quaterly%
20Analytical%20Anglais%20ok_North%20Africa%
20Quaterly%20Analytical.pdf.
African Development Fund. (2008). Tunisia, Tunisia-
Monastir and Enfidha airports project environmental and
social impact assessment. ESIA study, Private Sector
department infrastructure and PPP division.
Allan, J. R. (1999). Public-private partnerships: A review of
literature and practice (Public Policy Paper N°4).
Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, University of
Regina.
Araújo, S., & Sutherland, D. (2010). Public-private partner-
ships and investment in infrastructure (OECD Economics
Department Working Paper No. 803). Paris, France:
OECD Publishing.
Arrow, K. J. (1985). Informational Structure of the Firm. The
American Economic Review, 75(2), 303–307.
Ayee, J. R. A. (2005). Public sector management in Africa
(Economic Research Working Paper N°82). Tunis,
Tunisia: African Development Bank, pp. 1–60.
Boyfield, K. (1992). Private sector funding of public sector
infrastructure. Public Money & Management, 12(2), 41–46.
doi:10.1080/09540969209387708
Brown, A., Orr, A., & Luo, J. (2006). The suitability of Public
Private Partnerships in the provision of sustainable hous-
ing in China. World Review of Entrepreneurship,
Management and Sustainable Development, 2(1), 101–125.
Buchanan, J., & Tolluck, G. (1962). The calculus of consent.
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Chédor, S., Teulon, F., & Veil-Zarda, C. (2011). Les partenar-
iats public-privé en Afrique du Nord: Le cas de la gestion
de l’eau. Maghreb-Machrek, 209(3), 9–26.
Cohen, M. D., March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1972). A garbage
can model of organizational choice. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 17(1), 1–25.
Deloitte Research. (2006). Closing the infrastructure gap: The
role of public-private partnerships. London, UK: Deloitte
Development LLP.
Dilami, M., & Klein, M. (1997). Government support to
private infrastructure projects in emerging markets. In T.
Irwin (Ed.), World Bank Latin American and Caribbean
studies viewpoints: Dealing with public risk in private infra-
structure (pp. 21–42). Washington, DC: World Bank.
Downs, A. (1967). Inside bureaucracy. Boston, MA: Little,
Brown.
Esposito, M. C. (2010). La Politique des partenariats public-
privé: Une approche bipartisane en évolution. Observatoire
De La Société Britannique, pp. 51–68.
Estache, A., Guasch, J.-L., Iimi, A., & Trujillo, L. (2009).
Multidimensionality and renegotiation: Evidence from
transport-sector public-private-partnership transactions in
Latin America. Review of Industrial Organization, 35(1/2),
41–71. doi:10.1007/s11151-009-9225-0
Farazmand, A. (2004). Sound governance in the age of glo-
balization: A conceptual framework. In Farazmand (Ed.),
Sound governance: Policy and administration innovation
(pp. 1–24). Westport, CT: Praeger.
Farazmand, A. (1999). Building partnerships for governance.
Background paper presented at the UN-sponsored World
Congress on Governance, Manila, The Philippines, May
31– June 4.
Finnerty, J. D. (1996). Project financing: Asset-based financial
engineering. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Grimsey, D., & Lewis, M. (2002). Evaluating the risks of
public private partnerships for infrastructure projects.
International Journal of Project Management, 20, 107–118
doi:10.1016/S0263-7863(00)00040-5
IFC. (2008, April). Summary of proposed investment, INT’L
FIN. CORP. Retrieved from http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/spi
website1.nsf/0/9F0D31A0EFB9FC06852576BA000E2B83
(discussingthe TAV Tunisie Project).
Jones, I., Zamani, H., & Reehal, R. (1996). Financing models
for new transport infrastructure. Luxembourg: OPEC.
Kettl, D. F., & Milward, H. B. (Eds.). (1996). The state of
public management. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Kirkpatrick, I., & Lucio, M. (1996). Introduction: The con-
tract state and the future of public management. Public
Administration, 74(1), 1–8. doi:10.1111/padm.1996.74.
issue-1
Klijn, E.-H., & Teisman, G. R. (2002). Institutional and stra-
tegic barriers to public-private partnership: An analysis of
Dutch cases. Paper presented at the British Academy of
Management Conference, 9–11 September, Middlesex
University, London.
Li, B., Akintoye, A., Edwards, P. J., & Hardcastle, C. (2005).
Critical success factors for PPP/PFI projects in the UK
construction industry. Construction Management and
Economics, 23(5), 459–471. doi:10.1080/
01446190500041537
Marty, F. (2008). Les enjeux économiques et industriels liés
au recours aux partenariats public-privé dans le domaine
spatial Une application: Le contrat de Private Finance
Initiative britannique Skynet V.
Marty, F., & Voisin, A. (2006). L’évolution des montages
financiers des PFI britanniques: La montée des risques.
Revue Française de Finances Publiques, 94, 107–120.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 561
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [Q
ata
r U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
1:2
0 2
1 J
un
e 2
01
6 
Mohammed, B.-M. (2010). Financing water services in the Arab
countries public private participation, PPP, The Jordanian
Experience, Private Sector Involvement in Water
Infrastructure in Lebanon. Beirut, Lebanon: The Arab
Countries Water Utilities Association (ACWUA). Retrieved
from http://www.inbonews.org/IMG/pdf/Financing_Water_
in_the_Arab_Countries_Beirut89_3_2010.pdf
Mohyeldin, A. (2011, January 20). Suicide sparked Tunisia
revolution. Al Jazeera English, Opinion. Retrieved from
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2010/12/
20101231161958792947.html
Niskanen, W. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative govern-
ment. Chicago, IL: Aldine-Atherton.
OECD. (2008). Public–private partnerships: In pursuit of risk
sharing and value for money. Paris, France: OECD.
OECD. (2009). Bridging state capacity gaps in situations of
fragility, partnership for democratic development. Paris,
France: OECD.
Orsi, S. D. (2011). Arab spring brings winds of change to the
Maghreb and MENA region: Does that spell opportunity
for infrastructure development and project finance?
Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business, 11, 77–124.
Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing government:
How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming government.
Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Public Comp.
Osborne, S. (Ed.). (2000). Public-private partnerships: Theory and
practice in international perspective. London, UK: Routledge.
Qiao, L., Wang, S. Q., Tiong, R. L. K., & Chan, T.-S. (2001).
Framework for critical success factors of BOT projects in
China. The Journal of Structured Finance, 7(1), 53–61.
doi:10.3905/jsf.2001.320244
Roudi-Fahimi, F., & Kent, M. (2007). Challenges and oppor-
tunities: The population of the Middle East and North
Africa. Population Reference Bureau, 62(2), 24.
Sadiki, L. (2010, December 27). Tunisia: The battle of Sidi
Bouzid. Al Jazeera English, Opinion. Retrieved from http://
eng l i sh .a l j azeera .ne t / indepth/opin ion/2010/12/
20101227142811755739.html
Sengupta, U. (2006). Government intervention and public–
private partnerships in housing delivery in Kolkata.
Habitat International, 30(3), 448–461. doi:10.1016/j.
habitatint.2004.12.002
Stein, S. W. (1995). Construction Financing and BOT pro-
jects. International Business Lawyer. International Bar
Association, 23(4), 173–180.
Timeline: Tunisia’s uprising. (2011, January 23). Al Jazeera
English, Africa. Retrieved from http://english.aljazeera.net/
indepth/spotlight/tunisia/2011/01/201114142223827361.
html
Tunisian Ministry of Tourism. (2014). Retrieved from http://
www.tourisme.gov.tn/index.php?id=206
Tunisian Ministry of Transportation. (2011). Retrieved from
http://www.transport.tn/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=104&Itemid=107&lang=fr
UNEVOC Centers. (2006). Good practices in public-private
partnership and labour market orientation in TVET in the
MENA region. A study tour for UNVECO centers. Cairo,
Egypt.
Vining, A. R., & Boardman, A. E. (2008). Public-private
partnerships: Eight rules for governments. Public Works
Management & Policy, 13(2), 149–161 doi:10.1177/
1087724X08323843
Williamson, O. (1975). Markets and hierarchies. Analysis and
antitrust implications: A study in the economics of internal
organization. New York, NY: Free Press.
Williamson, O. (1985). The economic institutions of capital-
ism. Firms, markets, relational contracting. New York, NY:
Free Press.
World Bank (The). (1994). World development report:
Infrastructure for development. Washington, DC:
Author.
World Bank (The). (2014). Tunisia overview. Retrieved from
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tunisia/overview
World Bank. (2007). Private participation in infrastructure
database. Singapore: Author. Retrieved from http://ppi.
worldbank.org
World Bank. (2008). Annual Report: Helping to eliminate
poverty and achieve sustainable development through pub-
lic-private partnerships in infrastructure. Public-Private
Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF). Washington,
DC: World Bank.
World Bank. (2011). PPIAF assistance in Tunisia. Public-
Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF).
Washington, DC: World Bank.
562 N. A. BENMANSOUR
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [Q
ata
r U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
1:2
0 2
1 J
un
e 2
01
6 
